414

Andrews University Seminary Studies 57 (Autumn 2019)

4:14–34; Acts 13:15, 15:21, 17:2; 1 Tim 4:13) as well as the need to internalize its instructions (e.g., Deut 6:6–9, 11:18–21), all this in order to act
upon the basis of conviction rather than coercion. Finally, Lanni argues that,
even if the ancient Athenian “courts did not predictably and reliably enforce
statutes,” still “these laws had a symbolic force that operated as a significant
influence on everyday behavior” (118). Again, we find a parallel to ancient
Israel, where the ideal was to have the law written on one’s heart rather than
being enforced by social control.
In this way, I find Lanni’s book instructive for biblical studies on how
Torah might have functioned in ancient Israel, as well as giving us a fascinating glimpse into ancient Athens. In addition, while our modern cultures are
very different, they nevertheless draw from both ancient Israel and Athens.
Therefore, it may be very instructive to reflect on how these societies sought
to maintain peace and order differently than we do.
Vesterålen, Norway

Kenneth Bergland
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The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism was put together to promote
discussion on the nature of humans and their mental states—specifically
views under the umbrella of substance dualism in a broad sense as well as
critiques of these views from a variety of perspectives. The open intent of
its organizers is “to construct a level playing ground of debate for all of the
various positions and their critics” (1). The work was edited by Jonathan J.
Loose (senior lecturer in philosophy and psychology at Heythrop College,
University of London), Angus J. L. Menuge (professor of philosophy at Concordia University Wisconsin and president of the Evangelical Philosophical
Society), and J. P. Moreland (professor of philosophy at Talbot School of
Theology, Biola University).
The volume contains thirty-two articles written by twenty-nine contributors. After two introductory articles, the remaining ones are organized into
three parts: first, “Articulating Substance Dualism”; second, “Alternatives
to Substance Dualism,” and, third, “Substance Dualism, Theology, and the
Bible.” Each of these parts is further divided into subsections, each containing
two or three articles that debate a given topic from different perspectives so
as to allow readers to “decide for themselves where the better arguments lie”
(1). In part one, the debates are on emergent dualism, Thomistic dualism,
Cartesian dualism, the unity of consciousness, and near-death experiences. In
part two, authors debate animalism, nonreductive physicalism, constitution-
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alism, and emergent individualism. In part three, the debates are on biblical
anthropology, the incarnation, and the resurrection.
The main strength of the volume is its philosophical approach, as can
be seen from the expertise of the editors and the methods utilized by most
contributors. Articulating the nature of humans and of the human mind from
a variety of philosophical stances gives readers a wealth of perspectives on the
subject matter. A second asset of this companion is that it allows each topic
of discussion to be dealt with from different and often opposing viewpoints.
Thus, even though the volume is openly trying to support substance dualism,
each of its favorable positions on any given topic is balanced by one contrary
article. In this sense, readers are given the benefit of alternate proposals and
solutions, though the number of articles favoring dualism is somewhat greater
than those challenging it (nineteen to thirteen). A third positive observation, which I noticed sprinkled here and there throughout the book, is that
while trying to make their case in a persuasive manner, some authors show
an awareness that evidence alone does not suffice to make the case either
way. As Gary Habermas puts it, “the real, underlying issue in these matters is
very frequently not about straightforward dialogues regarding where the best
evidence lies, but is more about a momentous clash of worldviews” (243).
William Lycan (22, 34n3), Nancy Murphy (322–323), and Angus Menuge
(394), to different degrees, also seem to be aware of, or acknowledge, the
impact of worldviews (and the assumptions embedded in them) on the interpretation of reality. I find this recognition helpful in studying human nature
and the philosophy of mind because it points to a more realistic approach
to these issues and warns readers against the naïve belief that data by itself is
enough to convince people one way or another.
Given the Judeo-Christian theistic perspectives of most contributors and
the editors’ intent to advance theism against naturalism (1, 10–11), some
may perceive the volume’s modest interaction with and articulation of biblical material (only six of thirty-two articles deal more directly with biblical
content, although several others do it tangentially) as a limitation. But this
is not necessarily a weakness of this companion in comparison with other
studies. It rather represents a wider phenomenon in the field of Christian
philosophy and systematic theology where the interaction with biblical
scholarship is minimal. Within this methodology, the contribution of biblical
data and concepts in context of the ANE is not sufficiently influential in
the development of anthropologies. This is a major disadvantage as it limits
research and tends to lock the debate down to philosophical and/or systematic categories, often within the bandwidth of classical philosophy. For these
reasons, among others, I will comment on the underrepresented category of
biblical material and more specifically on the two articles that attempt to
engage with the issue of human nature from a biblical perspective.
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John W. Cooper, author of the article “Biblical Anthropology Is Holistic
and Dualistic,” advocates biblical anthropology as dualistic because “although
God created and redeems humans as embodied persons, he sustains us disembodied between death and bodily resurrection”—and holistic because “the
person-body dichotomy [is] an abnormal and diminished condition” (415).
In his interaction with biblical scholars Joel B. Green and N. T. Wright,
Cooper asserts that all three of them affirm holism, and that therefore
“holism is not at issue” (413). When assessing Green’s and Wright’s critiques
of dualism, however, Cooper feels that their objections are anachronistic
(because they critique historical, instead of contemporary dualistic articulations) and inaccurate (because they fail to consider wholistic dualists). In order
to advance his case, Cooper uses the following strategy: he attempts to define
terms more narrowly and assesses OT anthropology in creation (Gen 2:7), the
afterlife in the OT, and then anthropology and eschatology in Second Temple
Judaism, closing with NT anthropology and eschatology.
A helpful contribution Cooper makes to the discussion is a call for more
precise terminology, especially in regards to the distinction between monism
and holism, since the two terms are often used interchangeably, which can
create confusion (though the biblical data seem to defy the familiar categories “monism” and “dualism,” as we will see below). Another significant
observation I can agree with is Cooper’s insistence that the biblical creation
text in Gen 2:7 indicates “two basic ingredients from which God makes a
nephesh chayah [a living being],” namely, “neshamah [breath] and dirt” (417).
This appears to be an accurate description of the Genesis creation account.
However—and now I turn to my critiques—I do not share Cooper’s conclusion. For him, “this text therefore expresses generic dualism.” Such a leap
requires assuming that the breath (or spirit) is a conscious, thinking, and
somewhat operational person just lacking embodiment—an assumption
not provided by the text. It is presupposed by Cooper, and it determines
his conclusion. If one follows the narrative without this prior commitment,
the account seems to suggest that consciousness and action result from the
combination of the breath and the body (dust of the ground). Only after this
unity of “ingredients” occurs do we have human existence and activity. In the
creation narrative, living human beings are a third reality different from and
greater than the sum of the two initial ingredients. Thus, when drawing data
from the Genesis creation account alone, the phenomenon of human life can
be described as some sort of emergent wholism, but not “generic dualism”
as Cooper proposes. Cooper then applies the same dualistic reading to other
biblical texts from which he tries to establish afterlife “subsistence.” This is
the idea that permeates Cooper’s entire article. As he puts it, “the decisive
issue is whether persons subsist after death” (418). But a more decisive issue
for Cooper may be whether his assumption about the nature of the spirit/
breath is justified. Cooper’s interpretation is also colored by some genre and
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style oversight, as well as a bit of neglect of the organic nature of anthropological metaphors (see Green, op. cit. below). Without them and without the
prior commitment to afterlife subsistence, the texts Cooper analyses can be
explained in other ways. Finally, Cooper generally analyses passages that only
indirectly deal with human nature. For instance, he does not go over texts
like Eccl 12:7, which discusses death—the disassembling of the ingredients
for life (“and the dust returns to the earth as it was, and the spirit returns
to God who gave it,” ESV; though here we do not have neshemah, but “its
synonym ruach” [417]; see Gen 7:22 for a combined form). In its intratextual
context, Eccl 12:7 does not entail dualism, for each ingredient by itself is
not operational (see Eccl 9:5–6, 10). Hence, while Cooper brings important
observations and clarifications to the discussion of human nature, his choice
of texts is not optimum, and his dualistic interpretation is more the result of
a precommitment to human subsistence in an intermediary state (Christian
tradition) than a necessary conclusion from interpreting biblical passages in
their proper loci (in context).
Joel B. Green in “The Strange Case of the Vanishing Soul” documents
the decline of the translation “soul” for the word ψυχή in English Bibles from
thirty-nine occurrences back in the 1611 KJV to three in the 2011 CEB.
According to Green, the phenomenon results from Bible linguists’ gradual
forsaking of the popular English usage of “soul” “where it usually refers to
an immaterial, immortal part of a human” and the adoption of terms that
are more sensitive to the Greek nuances of ψυχή which refer to the various
aspects of human life such as “person,” “life,” “inner person,” etc. (428). He
explains the decline of the usage of the term “soul” in three ways: first, dualist
tendencies brought into the NT text interpretation by theological and philosophical traditions have been greatly challenged by historical research focused
on the first-century background of the NT; second, sociocultural perceptions
have conditioned Western readers’ understanding of human nature, and these
cultural perceptions, in turn, are “read . . . back into” NT texts; third, “rereading . . . New Testament texts that served previously as taken-for-granted illustrations of the New Testament’s anthropological dualism” (429). Green has
done this elsewhere. In this article he rereads 1 Peter, which contains the word
ψυχή six times. He notes that 1 Peter does not contain Philo’s “references to
body and soul as discrete human essences,” or to the “soul’s sovereignty over
the body,” or to “the body as a tent or shrine in which the soul might dwell”
(435). The only dualism Green finds in 1 Peter is eschatological (“life in this
world versus life in the age to come,” [436]), and concludes that “Peter’s
anthropology is . . . twice embodied—bodily life . . . indivisible in terms of
a person’s essential unity, but also full-bodied life among a people called to
follow Christ’s example” (437). I appreciate Green’s documentation of the
decline of the use of the word “soul” in recent translations as well as the
reasons he gives for the phenomenon, though I am not so sure this is not also

418

Andrews University Seminary Studies 57 (Autumn 2019)

influenced by “the natural sciences in the modern era,” as he suggests. To his
credit, I concede that such influence does not detract from his exposition. I
also welcome Green’s sensitivity to the powerful role of presuppositions in
interpreting texts (430).
On the book as a whole, I agree with the editors that The Blackwell
Companion to Substance Dualism is a “valuable resource for scholars in a
variety of disciplines (notably, philosophy of mind, psychology, and theological anthropology) and a useful reference for those interested in doing further
work advancing the case for or against substance dualism” (11).
Adventist University of São Paulo

Flavio Prestes III

Van der Merwe, Christo H., Jacobus A. Naudé, and Jan H. Kroeze, eds. Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar. 2nd ed. New York: T&T Clark, 2017.
640 pp. Softcover. USD 43.16.
It has been a long wait for this significantly updated popular Biblical Hebrew
Reference Grammar that first appeared in 1999 from Sheffield Academic
Press. The first edition of this grammar was particularly popular among Bible
translators but was also well received by students of biblical Hebrew and
exegetes. The quality of its content was warranted by the academic quality of
its authors. Particularly, van der Merwe’s work and research groups are well
known in the field. His close work with Bible societies and Bible translation
predestined him, together with Naudé and Kroeze, to write a grammar that
shines as a reference tool for all those that work with biblical Hebrew on a
regular basis. Today, a digital version of both the first and this second edition are available in Logos Bible Software and help to advance the exegetical
workflow.
Now, after eighteen years, the grammar has been updated by an additional
236 pages (current total of 640 pages), that is, more than 50 percent of the
total page number of the first edition (404 pages). This amplification is
caused by the integration of insights that were generated through the linguistic research of the last 10 years: Andrason (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013), Oakes
(2011), Cook (2012), Joosten (2012), Miller-Naude & Zevit (2012),Kahn
(2013), Schniedewind (2013), van der Merwe (2013, 2014), Holmstedt
(2014), Jones (2014), Rezetko & Young (2014), Lamprecht (2015), Naude
(2015, 2016), Bivin (2017).
Despite the massive updates, this edition still functions as a reference
grammar (and this is good!) and lacks features that come with comprehensive
grammars like the one of Joüon-Muraoka. But one can state firmly that this
latest edition is the most up-to-date Hebrew grammar on the market and will
be one of the most important reference works for Hebrew in the next decade.

